Robert Hayes Kee,
Department of Polite Aesthetic Praxis
Greetings again, dear readers. We sit
at a time of transition, of beginning again. Following the dispersion
of the urbane to bucolia for a season, we have reintegrated with our
urbanity. I write to you, once again, from the familiar bastion of
the university library. I would like to thank the staff of this
institution for feigning ignorance of my pecunious infractions of the
previous semester when we pass amidst the shelves. Their politeness
shines as a light in this season of recongregation. Trading our
brogues for balmorals and our madras for worsteds, we are once again
an oppidan mass, and with this tumultuation, comes oppugnancy,
acrimony, and discord. It is a perfect time to once again offer the
gracious guidance of etiquette to the issues of this column’s
assiduous readers. To assuage readers’ fears of being alone in
this numerosity, an irrelative one amongst the many, I give extended
regard to only one question.
Robert Hayes Kee
August 25, 2014
Atlanta, GA
I recently criticized
the work of a retrograde esthetic practitioner. This work rehashes
tired forms under a rubric of ‘expression,’ completely
unreflexive and without any conceptual grounding. My interlocutor
responded with a claim that my disdain was rooted in a simple,
Freudian desire for the repression of that human’s work, and
thus as something I feared as a challenge to the ‘potency’
of my own praxis. Was I right to publicly criticize this work? Do we,
those of powerful esthetic praxis, have a standard of work, below
which, we may politely allow an unguarded critique? Do I owe my
interlocutor a response, given their anemic antiphony to a
considered critique?
We have, dear
readers, approached an issue that desiderates some delicacy. To run,
with your interlocutor’s unreflexivity, toward the
dialectic of advance and decline is to engage with one of Western
culture’s most harmful binaries. We should be generally chary
toward the dialectic, but never moreso than here. Marx himself stated
that he only described his own work as dialectical when no other
appellation suited. To engage with the dialectic is to engage with
Hegel; it is the ‘only profound enemy’ of pluralism, and
thus requires extreme caution. Some combinations of forces are indeed
dialectical, but its stilt legs are not strong foundations. We cannot
rest the weight of a metaphysics upon them. A properly Nietzschean
relation of forces does not cast difference as renitency, nor should
we follow this line from antagonism to its inevitable terminus in
strife. Etiquette without a foregrounding of difference is merely a
playbook of oppression.
It is unsurprising that your
interlocutor could match the unreflexivity of their work with the
unreflexivity of their embrace of one of Freud’s weakest
formulations, one that relies on the horrendous notion of ‘necessary
opposites.’ A large part of the value of our company is that it
is given voluntarily. This is what gives weight to our commitment to
others; the statement that, ‘this period in time, between now
and death, I offer to you.’ To devalue this existential
commitment is a high crime against life. Should I view an
interlocutor’s work as a suitable object of criticism, I am
giving of my time before death in the same way that I do to friends.
Casting this choice as an obligation, as if one and one’s
opponent were Holmes and Moriarty, rolling over a waterfall to allow
the retirement of a tired writer, misses a critical aspect of the
conviviality of life. Only from here we can see the absurdity and
beauty of this gesture, acting as if we were livestock, carving
ourselves up at the sideboard and offering pieces of our
ever-diminishing corpus for the fulfillment of our interlocutors.
If we examine the
proper Freudian repression mechanism in this critique, and not just
the groundings of that formulation, matters do not improve. As your
critique and its response were public ones, I have availed myself of
their specifics. Your interlocutor grounded the opposition between
avant-garde and decadent art in a dialectic, and then cast the
avant-garde as the repressor of the decadent. They do not reverse
the power dynamic of Nietzsche’s politics, but nonetheless cast
the avant-garde as the villain. This alone should sow doubts in our
minds about this reading of art history. We are all very familiar
with Nietzsche’s bequest that we protect the strong from the
weak. To see this contorted to vilify the strong is a bizarre turn
indeed. The author justifies this grounding psychologically, stating
that the avant-gardist is jealous of the success and adoration of the
decadent, popular art; the artist fears the assimilation of their own
work into canon and attacks others ostensibly vying for entry into
it.
This writer views
the whole modernist project as a progression of impotent paranoiacs,
forever concerned with their declining relevance, as if each work of
art were made by atomic fission. The author states that the entire
modernist project is unconcerned with history, merely floating
through a succession of present moments, grafting a shallow novelty
onto each of them. This notion of artist–as–inner-tuber
deeply offends the sensibilities of your interlocutor. They desire
heavy lifting from their artists, spiritual depth, and a ‘solid,
stable, self-sufficient whole.’ We contemporary artists
understand that, while we are postmodern, we did not become so by
being mailed past the modern. We have processed its cultural
experience; we have read at least one of its foundational novels.
The advent of the
seventh decade of the previous century did not negate the work of
those previous. We have, across media, experienced the collapse of
ideal unities, and we have all built our houses from the fragments.
I, for one, have no desire to resurrect these old structures. I am
pleased to know that my human being is a false unity, one of
convenience, since there is no way, down to the molecular level, to
distinguish myself from my surroundings. I do not strive to be the
unity of desire and reason, nor do I know how to distinguish what
interaction of these two abstract elements is the ideal of ‘balance.’
Requiring ‘a seamless dialectic of semiotic structure and
desire’ is one of the most horrific stringencies I have ever
heard. I had hoped, dear readers, that every last one of us had
buried any remaining hopes for unities of this nature. To espouse
the view that desire as some kind of preternatural opponent of
structure, an unconstructive, unbound flow; and to couple this view
with one of language as structure and tool of the superego is to
cause this writer gastric cruciation. To take this view and see it as
the ideal of art couples that cruciation with cranial delaceration.
I have, before, briefly outlined my
thoughts regarding expression as the teleology of art. In short, I
am against this view. I regard no generic resurrection with as much
disdain as neo-expressionism. To view positively, the project of art
as an unbroken continuum from Lascaux to the present is bewildering.
To see the diversity of esthetic praxes as a primary unity with a
common emotional goal is the ultimate solipsism of winter philosophy.
I have my
sympathies for practitioners of its first few waves, and find myself
strolling to Die Brücke to see the crest of
these waves at every opportunity. While it addresses a central
esthetic conflict, that conflict is over one hundred and fifty years
old. We should regard the ancient regime of Europe as the
ultimate experts in protracted warfare, and their longest engagement
was one hundred years. Take this as a cue, readers.